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Abstract—The growth of the security industry is sparking a 
significant interest in well-rounded security professionals. 
Regional and national competitions in the academic community 
have been developed to help identify qualified candidates to 
support this industry. A course has been built to allow students to 
improve their skills in this area. This paper describes the process 
used to administer events in the support of such a competitive 
environment, and the process by which appropriate 
infrastructures are developed. 
Keywords-cyber security education, security competition; 
information security 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In September 2011, the authors led a seminar course 
entitled "Cyber Defense Techniques." This course places 
students into small teams for attack-defend events on small 
enterprise networks, mimicking the style of the National 
Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition [2]. A major benefit of 
providing such an environment is the ability to expose 
students to the operations of malicious users that commit 
digital crime, improving their skills at defending systems and 
networks from attack. In this paper, we discuss the specific 
roles and responsibilities of our positions in the course, 
elaborate on pertinent details concerning the seminar and its 
operation, provide interpretation of the results of the activity 
performed by the students, and discuss the lessons taken away 
from this unique experience. 
II. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
A. Abbreviations and Acronyms 
Below is a list of terms used throughout this document, 
along with their meanings: 
 
 CCDC: Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition. One 
of the United States' premier collegiate cyber security 
competitions, held annually, culminating in a national 
competition featuring the winning team from each of 
the ten U.S. regions in San Antonio, Texas. This 
event is the basis for the course layout and structure. 
 Blue team: the team of students chosen to secure and 
defend a small enterprise infrastructure and to 
complete business tasks [1,5]. 
 Grey team: the team of students responsible for the 
development of blue team infrastructure and the 
creation, delegation, and assessment of business 
tasks. Normally, these two roles would be split into 
two teams, white for business tasks and black for 
development of infrastructure [1,4]. 
 Red team: the team of students who will be acting as 
penetration testers for a given event. The team's 
responsibilities include reconnaissance, vulnerability 
identification, infiltration, data theft, and sabotage, as 
directed by the grey team [1]. 
 Inject: a business task for the blue team to complete. 
Injects are not "mandatory," although failing to 
perform an inject resulted in no points being awarded. 
Each inject was given an independent maximum 
point value and was scored by the grey team after a 
predetermined time. 
 Service check: an operation performed by the event 
scoring engine to assess the functional and correct 
operation of a network service based on specific grey 
team criteria, run at a predetermined interval. A 
check was only successful if it fully met all criteria. A 
separate check was used for each network service. 
 Service uptime: The amount of checks assessed by 
the scoring engine to be successful, typically 
expressed as a percentage. 
 NSSA: The Rochester Institute of Technology 
department of Networking, Security and Systems 
Administration [3]. 
 Cyber Defense Techniques: The name of the seminar 
course described in this paper. It may also be referred 
to as "the course" or "the seminar." 
 
III. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. Roles and Responsibilities 
A course instructor for Cyber Defense Techniques 
(Johnson, Stackpole) is given five primary responsibilities: 
 
 To provide overall direction for the course 
 To lecture students on technologies and techniques 
relevant to each team role in the events 
 To provide counsel, insight, or assistance to student 
teams as requested 
 To ensure fairness of competition by removing bias, 
while providing a gradual increase in event difficulty 
 To assess student performance to provide an 
academic grade for the course 
 
A teaching assistant for Cyber Defense Techniques 
(Mauer) is given three primary responsibilities: 
 
 To provide counsel, insight, or assistance to student 
teams as requested 
 To ensure fairness of competition by removing bias, 
while providing a gradual increase in event difficulty 
 To operate the scoring engine during each event 
B. Execution of Duties 
The authors have acquired experience at the CCDC on both 
blue and red teams. This experience proved to be invaluable in 
providing counsel to students when needed. Understanding the 
format of CCDC, its goals, and the type of challenges 
presented during the competitions helped eliminate confusion 
amongst grey teams as to what types of challenges were 
appropriate to build into the infrastructure, and streamlined the 
communication of ideas between the grey team and us. 
Although any team could freely ask questions, this was most 
often used by the grey teams to overcome their lack of 
experience in doing work in this area. The seminar is an 
advanced course; as such, assistance was only given to 
students to achieve their desired goals by providing direction 
and opinion. 
The students were placed into specific teams to try to 
achieve three teams of equal measure. To maintain a high-
quality event free of bias, each event infrastructure was 
analyzed to ensure no steps were taken to gain an advantage 
from a particular team setup. After the completion of each 
event, the next grey team was expected to take into 
consideration the lessons learned from the previous event to 
provide a more challenging infrastructure for this new event. 
Each event infrastructure was subject to approval before being 
put into use to verify the appropriate difficulty level was met. 
The grey team was also asked to provide all of the 
necessary information to properly score a network service so 
that the scoring engine could be properly configured. A 
configuration file was then written containing this information, 
which would be processed by the scoring engine during its 
operation. The scoring engine used was commissioned for the 
2006 National CCDC, written in C and Perl. Each service 
would be checked by the engine every three minutes. A 
successful check was recorded if the service provided the 
expected response as designated by the grey team. Any other 
response was considered a failure, as the checks were designed 
by the original programmers to simulate how an end user of a 
system would attempt to use the service being checked. 
IV. COURSE STRUCTURE AND LAYOUT 
A. General Course Layout 
The course was divided into two major components: 
lectures and events. The first four weeks of the course were 
lectures that provided students an understanding of the basic 
components of each aspect of the event. Such topics included 
a primer on the use of the nmap network scanner and the 
Metasploit Framework for penetration testing, as well as 
illustrating techniques for securing core network services such 
as the Domain Name System, Internet webservers, and File 
Transfer Protocol. Students were also briefed on the roles and 
responsibilities of the grey team, with which many students 
did not have previous experience. The students were then 
placed into teams of four, one for each of the three roles 
needed in each event. The student teams would take a different 
role for each of the three events to experience red, blue, and 
grey team operations. Starting in the fifth week, the remaining 
six weeks were used for the completion of three event rounds. 
B. Event Layout 
Each event lasted for two consecutive course meetings for 
a total of three to four hours of activity time, depending on the 
setup and teardown time needed to return the lab environment 
to its original state. The events were conducted on an isolated 
network comprised of eight VMware ESX hypervisor 
computers, hosting all of the virtual machines the students 
would be using to attack, defend, and monitor the event. This 
virtual infrastructure was only in use during course hours to 
enforce a supervised and controlled competition environment. 
A preparatory meeting was held before the scheduled start of a 
given event. At this meeting, the grey team introduced the 
specifics of each role to its respective team for that event, 
including the type of infrastructure to be defended, the 
priorities the blue team should consider for defending the 
given infrastructure and network services, and priority of 
targets for the red team. The grey team was also given 
permission to provide unclear, misleading, or false 
information if they chose to do so. 
The meeting immediately following the completion of the 
event was reserved for debriefing from the grey team; typical 
components discussed included any observations they 
recorded, score analysis of blue team performance on network 
service uptime and inject completion, and any 
recommendations they wished to provide. Red team and blue 
team members were also invited to share their observations 
and opinions. 
In between each event was a week-long period that the 
grey team would use to consult with us to build the 
infrastructure for the next event. Some suggestions to the grey 
team included what services were appropriate in the type of 
scenario they envisioned to develop, as well as techniques or 
ideas on how to introduce hidden vulnerabilities into systems 
the blue team would be defending. Modeling the course after 
the style of CCDC allows the grey team to provide an 
infrastructure that is "broken"; systems may not have been 
fully patched and up to date, services could have been left 
misconfigured, and hosts may have had backdoors or other 
malware already installed on them. As previously stated, each 
event was conducted entirely in a location that had no Internet 
access, significantly hampering the capability to patch 
systems, which provided an additional challenge for both red 
and blue teams. 
V. COMPARISON TO SIMILAR EVENTS 
In the United States, cyber security exercises have existed 
since 2001, with the establishment of the U.S. Military Cyber 
Defense Exercise (CDX) [4, 6, 7, 8]. The success of such an 
exercise has accelerated the growth of  additional exercises and 
projects in this area. Such documented exercises include a 
continuous, live, internal cyber defense activity at the 
University of Texas at Austin [9], an international capture-the-
flag event created by the University of California at Santa 
Barbara [10], and a semester length graduate course at Texas 
A&M [8]. Each of these events represents a slightly varied 
approach to education-oriented cyber security. As the success 
of these three events continued, a steering committee was 
established to develop a new cyber defense competition, 
containing members from the Center for Infrastructure 
Assurance and Security (CIAS) at the University of Texas at 
San Antonio, the University of Texas at Austin, and Texas 
A&M [6]. The resulting competition, the CCDC, is the primary 
inspiration for the course described in this paper. 
The seminar provides many of the same components 
offered at the CCDC and the exercises referenced above, but no 
two events are identical. The primary objective shared between 
each exercise is to provide the students interactive learning 
opportunities in realistic scenarios. As the course described in 
this paper is of finite duration, the objectives are more 
objective and quantifiable over the prescribed period than the 
event developed by the University of Texas at Austin. 
Similarly, a capture-the-flag component is not present at the 
CCDC or in this course. Therefore, the most direct comparison 
can be made to the CCDC and the semester course found at 
Texas A&M.  
A full-time project by the CIAS at the University of Texas 
at San Antonio, the CCDC performs scoring, judging, 
infrastructure development and Red Team assessment using 
neutral or third party entities and sponsors. The course 
described in this paper is smaller in scale than the CCDC, and 
temporal and financial constraints have limited the capability 
for third party sponsorship and participation in this exercise. 
However, by allowing the students to take on those additional 
roles, the students gain a well-rounded and more thorough 
appreciation for the specific operation of each team as well as 
an understanding of the considerable effort needed to bring 
such an exercise to fruition. The professional Red Team, White 
Team, and Black Team present at the CCDC create an 
environment that provides student Blue Teams considerable 
opportunity to demonstrate their cyber defense skill set, and the 
amount of feedback the professionals can provide is significant. 
As proponents of a comprehensive security education, the 
authors propose that structuring the course as described above 
allows the students to obtain an equivalent amount of 
knowledge over the duration of the course in a broader scope, 
by participating as a member of each team present in a given 
event. The authors recognize the potential for unfair treatment 
between student teams in an event, as the students will 
eventually design an event as the Grey Team and participate as 
Red Team members at some point during the course. As stated 
above, grey team infrastructure and inject inspection is required 
before an event begins, and the Grey Team as well as the 
course instructors actively monitor the competitors throughout 
the duration of each event round. The authors hope that 
continued experience in this fashion will allow for a more 
robust solution to maximize fairness and the opportunity for 
students to learn in such an environment. 
VI. OBSERVATIONS ON TEAM PERFORMANCE 
The interpretation of the results is centric to the interactions 
with each grey team for several reasons. It was necessary to 
interface with them directly to ensure the event was running as 
they intended, as they would be monitoring both teams for the 
entirety of the event. Any team-specific problems requiring 
attention would be channeled through the grey team to provide 
the competing teams more time and to streamline the event as a 
whole. To ensure flawless operation of the scoring engine, it 
was necessary to monitor its behavior at all times to correct any 
issues before they could impact scoring mechanisms. 
A. Event One 
The experiences observed with each grey team were more 
varied than anticipated. Many hours were spent with the first 
grey team discussing their plans to develop a fictitious online 
medical facility, complete with a website and generated patient 
records hosted in an SQL database. This event would showcase 
three major components: government compliance and 
standards enforcement, misconfigured services, and the 
OpenSolaris operating system. With a medical company based 
in the United States, patient records are subject to HIPAA 
regulations. As a result, the grey team later asked the blue team 
to provide a compliance report in this regard. The second most 
prevalent feature of this event was that of misconfigured 
services; the primary DNS server in this infrastructure allowed 
all zone transfers and supported dynamic updates from any 
machine. An attacker who is familiar with manipulating DNS 
could find a wealth of information about systems on the 
network and could easily change DNS information to suit their 
needs. 
The first grey team worked tirelessly toward developing a 
complete, eight node infrastructure with well thought out 
business injects, centering on system auditing, service 
improvements, policy, and HIPAA regulation. This first event 
would set a high bar for the remaining two, as the blue team 
visibly struggled with the foreign operating system and had a 
low inject completion rate. 
B. Event Two 
The second grey team, recognizing the high quality 
displayed by the previous team, set out to complete an even 
more ambitious task--to develop a twelve node server farm 
with separate administration machines. This idea was 
especially unique for two reasons: the departure from a 
standard small enterprise scenario and the inclusion of systems 
already “pre-hardened”. Competitions of this style typically 
feature a variety of systems, such as client workstations (that 
would be used by an employee) and servers running corporate 
services and storing company data. In contrast, the server farm 
implemented by the grey team was similar to a hosting 
company. In this scenario, nearly all of the operating systems 
and data residing on blue team servers would be owned by a 
customer, a significant departure from the small enterprise 
convention. The blue team was also given a guarantee that 
some of the systems provided to them by the "customer" have 
already been "hardened," although to what extent these systems 
were hardened was not divulged. Therefore, the new grey team 
was urged to perform security hardening techniques on some of 
the systems of their choosing so as not to overwhelm the 
second blue team with an increased amount of systems to 
protect. This course, while designed to be challenging to the 
students, is still only an academic exercise and preparatory 
course, and with an approximate event time of three to four 
hours, there simply would not be enough time for either team to 
fully explore the infrastructure and realize the maximum 
benefit from this particular exercise. 
The second event saw the return of misconfigured services 
and strongly emphasized the adherence to established service 
level agreements and contracts the company had entered into 
with the customer. The grey team explained to the blue team 
that one "site" had an uptime requirement of 75%, the second at 
50%, and the third at 25%. While these levels were simplified, 
it was effective at forcing the blue team to prioritize the 
handling of issues as they arose. 
The full infrastructure was not deployed as planned. The 
grey team was only able to deliver nine systems by the start of 
the event, plus two administration machines and a company-
wide pfSense software firewall. The red team was able to 
capitalize on this and explored further into the network more 
quickly due to poor configuration of the firewall and one of the 
Active Directory domain controllers. Nonetheless, there was 
clear indication that the blue team was aware of the 
ramifications of violating their service level agreement with the 
customer (a large point deduction). As a result, only one SLA 
was not met at the end of the event (50% SLA). 
C. Event Three 
For the final event, the last grey team chose to implement a 
small online casino. This scenario was established early on, but 
they were unsure of how to complete their environment. Two 
suggestions were offered: a Pluggable Authentication Module 
(PAM) configuration that would let anyone log in to the Linux 
systems with any password, or a sendmail email server that 
would execute arbitrary commands sent to it in email 
messages. The grey team eventually chose to implement a 
misconfigured PAM to complement a poorly secured web 
server. 
During the event, the last grey team was very observant and 
quick to respond to both the red and the blue teams. In 
particular, when they noticed the blue team was not working 
cohesively, the grey team initiated a mock fire drill to help the 
blue team regroup and renew their efforts. This proved to be 
beneficial; at the end of event three, the blue team had the 
highest inject completion rate of all three events. 
VII. EVENT DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
Even though the students were responsible for developing 
the infrastructure for each event and writing injects, there was 
one component of each event that was featured as a result of 
the authors’ collaboration. As a result, each event had one or 
two components that not only tied the event together, but 
represented a realistic component of a small enterprise to which 
the students may have needed more exposure. 
A. Event One - OpenSolaris and HIPAA Regulation 
Many of the courses taught in the NSSA department at RIT 
are taught using Red Hat Linux systems. While Red Hat and its 
derivatives are enterprise-friendly and capable operating 
systems, they do not constitute such a large portion of 
enterprise operating systems that exposing students to other 
operating systems would seem unnecessary. Solaris, then, 
seemed the most appropriate choice, due to its orientation to 
enterprise use, proliferation in technical environments, and its 
stability when virtualized on the ESX cluster used to host each 
event. Solaris is a complex and sophisticated operating system 
that include features offered by few others, and is built on a 
tested UNIX core platform. Although there was little 
opportunity to showcase the more advanced features, it was our 
hope that the exposure to the open-source (and free) 
OpenSolaris would be an eye-opening experience. Feedback 
from RIT alumni from the NSSA programs indicate it is 
evident that Solaris is still used frequently in many types of 
enterprises that hire administrators, network engineers, or 
security professionals. 
It was also important that students understand that they may 
be in possession of, or responsible for maintaining the 
confidentiality of information and documents. Medical records 
are one such type of information. As medical records are 
continuing to be made available digitally, regulations such as 
HIPAA will be more significant than ever. Companies who do 
business in this industry are bound by law to uphold these 
requirements concerning digital patient records, while ensuring 
doctors and other medical employees, as well as patients, can 
access the appropriate medical records in accordance with their 
rights. It behooves the persons responsible for the storage, 
safety, and security of this information to be vigilant in their 
duties to safeguard this information. 
B. Event Two - Provider/Customer Model and Service Level 
Agreements 
 We strongly advocated for the development of a server 
farm/hosting company scenario for the second event. Server 
hosting companies and cloud computing vendors have changed 
the landscape in which customers and enterprises do business. 
This scenario would also provide practical demonstration of the 
issues that hosting companies and cloud vendors face when 
providing network services for customers. Combining the 
aspects of honoring contractual obligations and service level 
agreements together would help students who plan on working 
for a service provider to understand the need to develop clearly 
defined, enforceable, and effective security policies and service 
level agreements. These documents apply to internal business 
as well as business between provider and customer. Due to the 
evident prioritization of the blue team response, meeting two 
out of three SLA requirements is a step in the right direction. 
C. Event Three - Dysfunctional Authentication and 
Compliance, Revisited 
In the final event, the grey team deployed the infrastructure 
to the blue team with deliberately misconfigured PAM for all 
of the Linux systems. As an online casino, this company could 
potentially be responsible for upholding Payment Card Industry 
(PCI) compliance for credit card transactions; a database 
breach could potentially result in the theft of a large volume of 
credit card information. An attacker can do all manner of 
malicious things to a system remotely, but the danger is even 
greater if the authentication mechanisms that provide most of 
the access control to a system do not function properly. This 
behavior was particularly difficult to find, as the system would 
often accept password changes and other control modifications, 
but they were not enforced. Although many students found it 
humorous that they could manipulate the system freely, the 
realization that this system was very poorly secured as a result 
of a simple misconfiguration resounded clearly. 
VIII. LESSONS LEARNED 
We have taken away several important lessons from these 
exercises. The students expressed that they have noticeably 
improved their skills, an opinion also shared by the authors. 
The students more firmly understand the value of team skills, 
and the observations presented in this paper help us to continue 
to refine our technique and expand our knowledge of operating 
this type of environment in which the students compete and 
learn. 
A. Student Improvement 
Based on our observations, students were not only more 
attuned to finding vulnerabilities in systems (both from an 
offensive and defensive perspective), but also more easily able 
to engage the thought processes of incident response and 
system auditing to improve system security. This experience as 
a seminar course provides additional learning in areas not 
typically covered by core curriculum, and is a superb addition 
to academic credentials and provides a broader foundation for 
continued study in this area. 
B. Teamwork and Interpersonal Skills 
The students have noticeably demonstrated a deeper 
appreciation of the importance of teamwork in an environment 
such as this. CCDC is a team competition, and many 
enterprises have teams of people or departments who work 
together frequently; consequently, an employee who can work 
successfully in a team setting can be very valuable. It was 
evident during the events that teams had initial internal friction 
over leadership and coordination; fortunately, much of it had 
been addressed by the end of the course, but teams who could 
not overcome that challenge admitted that they encountered 
continued difficulties. 
This effect was most profoundly demonstrated by the grey 
teams. While the students are capable of engaging in both red 
and blue team exercises in other controlled environments, to 
our knowledge, the grey team is a unique experience offered in 
an environment such as this. Understanding the differences in 
approach from competing in an event versus designing, 
building, administering, and scoring an event offers a deeper 
insight into the true goals of the event. The effects of this 
insight go full-circle; an effective grey team can build an 
infrastructure that sufficiently challenges the blue team and 
gives the red team opportunities to hone their skills. Effective 
scoring of injects requires the capability to quantify that the 
blue team has achieved the understanding necessary to properly 
complete assigned tasks. This, in turn, helps discourage teams 
from completing objectives simply to obtain the points each 
objective is worth. 
C. Knowledge for Future Endeavors 
Our involvement in CCDC in the past was beneficial in 
helping the students get the maximum benefit from the course, 
but this knowledge is only part of the solution. Understanding 
the spirit of CCDC, its goals, organization, and structure 
ensures the course follows the same path laid out by those 
responsible for CCDC; however, the competition is not run by 
specific guidelines that mandate certain systems, devices, or 
components to be present (or not present). Understanding how 
systems work when functioning properly, the way individual 
software components work together to produce a functioning 
system, and how changes to the system affect its operation 
(both seen and unseen) are many of the remaining pieces of this 
elaborate puzzle. Engaging in the development of such an 
exercise is a large undertaking, which can be improved upon by 
steadfast practice and learning from the experiences of others. 
As a result, we are confident that we can use this experience as 
a foundation for future endeavors in this area and improve the 
quality of the course as it matures. 
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